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THE SOCIOLOGICAL CHALLENGE 
OF REFLEXIVITY 
IN BOURDIEUSIAN THOUGHT 
 
Simon Susen 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of 
reﬂexivity. The concept of reﬂexivity plays a pivotal role in Bourdieu’s attempt to 
develop a ‘critical sociology’ (sociologie critique), often referred to as ‘reﬂexive 
sociology’ in the Anglophone literature. Based on a thorough textual analysis of 
his key works, the chapter aims to demonstrate that the following twelve 
elements are particularly important to Bourdieu’s conception of reﬂexivity: (1) 
‘science’, (2) ‘vigilance’, (3) ‘consciousness’, (4) ‘self-awareness’, (5) ‘critique’, 
(6) ‘self-objectiﬁcation’, (7) ‘distance-taking’ (8) ‘rupture’, (9) ‘epistemology’, (10) 
‘historicization’, (11) ‘understanding’ and (12) ‘emancipation’. Although the 
concept of reﬂexivity constitutes a useful methodological tool for the 
construction of critical epistemologies and for the pursuit of social research, 
it raises a number of signiﬁcant questions. It is the task of the ﬁnal section of 
this chapter to address several controversial issues that arise when one is faced 
with the challenge of evaluating the merits of Bourdieu’s account of reﬂexivity. 
In accordance with the structure of the foregoing inquiry, these issues will be 
synthesized on the basis of ‘twelve theses on Bourdieu’s conception of 
reﬂexivity’. 
 
‘Reﬂexivity’ 
Bourdieu makes extensive use of the concept of reﬂexivity throughout his 
writings. Indeed, the vital role that this concept plays in the development of 
his sociology is illustrated in the fact that it appears in the titles of several 
studies published by Bourdieu himself1 as well as in the titles of numerous 
2  
  
 
commentaries concerned with central aspects of his oeuvre.2 It is worth taking 
note of the etymological observation that the term ‘reﬂexivity’ is derived from 
the Latin word re-ﬂectere, meaning ‘to bend back’,3 that is, to recline with the 
intention of considering or reconsidering something in a paused, contemplative 
and – if necessary – critical fashion. Before launching into a detailed examination 
of his writings, let us draw our attention to three distinctive ambitions that 
characterize ‘Bourdieu’s brand of reﬂexivity’:4 
 
(a) the ambition to shed light on ‘the social and intellectual unconscious embedded in 
analytic tools and operations’,5 rather than on the individual or psychological 
unconscious of the seemingly isolated or atomized researcher; 
(b) the ambition to provide a critical understanding of social practices by 
conceiving of social inquiry as ‘a collective enterprise’,6 rather than by reducing 
investigative activity to ‘the burden of the lone academic’;7 and 
(c) the ambition to identify and explore the constitutive components that 
undergird ‘the epistemological security of sociology’,8 thereby challenging the view that 
radical uncertainty permeates all claims to objective, normative or  subjective 
validity. 
 
In the Bourdieusian universe, then, the project of developing ‘a critical the- 
ory of society’9 cannot be dissociated from the task of mobilizing the purpo- 
sive, collective and assertive resources inherent in the exercise of reﬂexivity. 
Far from representing a merely playful or self-sufficient endeavour based on 
arbitrary and disembedded language games, however, the whole point of the 
Bourdieusian plea for reﬂexivity is founded on a strong belief in both the pos- 
sibility and the epistemic authority of ‘scientiﬁc objectivity’10 and, hence, in 
the aspiration to contribute to ‘increasing the scope and solidity’11 of concep- 
tually informed, methodologically controlled and empirically substantiated 
inquiries. 
In this context, it may be useful to differentiate the following levels of analy- 
sis when grappling with the concept of reﬂexivity:12 
 
(a) The level of ‘ordinary reﬂexivity’: Insofar as they are ‘concept-bearing’13 entities 
capable of attributing meaning to, giving justiﬁcations for and coordinating 
their actions, human subjects are reﬂexive. 
(b) The level of ‘scientiﬁc reﬂexivity’: Insofar as they are equipped with the theoretical 
power to generate authoritative and evidence-based knowledge, as well as 
with the practical power to ‘inject’14 their epistemic resources into the reality 
that they aim to study, both the natural sciences and the social sciences are reﬂexive. 
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(c) The level of ‘societal reﬂexivity’: Insofar as – by virtue of both their theoretical and 
their practical tools – they possess the capacity to shape and to control their 
own civilizational development, human societies are reﬂexive.15 
 
What is missing from these interconnected levels of critical engagement with 
reality, however, is ‘the idea of reﬂexivity as a requirement and form of sociological work, 
that is, as an epistemological program in action for social science, and as a 
corollary a theory of intellectuals as the wielders of a dominated form of 
domination’.16 In other words, it is crucial that researchers and academics 
learn to face up to their own complicity in the construction of value-laden, meaning-
laden, perspective-laden, interest-laden, power-laden and tension-laden realities. The main 
implications of the previous considerations for Bourdieu’s conception of 
‘reﬂexive sociology’ can be synthesized as follows: 
 
Reﬂexive Sociology starts with the ‘very primitive assumption that theory is made 
by the praxis of men in all their wholeness and is shaped by the lives they lead’.17 
 
On this view, theory and praxis are inextricably linked: the pursuit of sociologi- 
cal reﬂexivity would be pointless without recognition of the fact that the objec- 
tive, normative and subjective representations generated by human subjects 
emerge within spatiotemporally contingent horizons of action and interaction. 
‘Reﬂexivity’, understood in this sense, cannot be reduced to the Hegelian notion 
of Selbstbewusstsein, that is, to an anthropologically constitutive ‘reﬂection of the 
subject on the subject’,18 bestowed with the species-distinctive capacity to seek 
worth of existential signiﬁcance by immersing itself in processes of mutual 
recognition. Rather, the purpose of a genuinely sociological reﬂexivity is to account 
for the fact that any interpretation of reality is, by deﬁnition, pervaded by 
different forms of bias. To be exact, from a Bourdieusian standpoint, there are at 
least three types of bias that ‘blur the sociological gaze’:19 
 
(a) The social origin: Fundamental sociological variables – such as class, ethnicity, 
gender, age and ability – shape the multiple ways in which members of 
differentiated human life forms perceive, interpret, relate to, act upon and 
interact with reality. Specialized social scientists are no less inﬂuenced by 
sociological factors than ordinary social actors. For the former are a 
subcategory of, rather than an aberration from, the latter.20 
(b) The academic ﬁeld: The sociologist – like any other researcher in the social 
sciences – occupies a position not only in the macrocosm of society, 
and thus ‘in the broader social structure’21 of the human universe, but 
also, more speciﬁcally, ‘in the microcosm of the academic ﬁeld’.22 Similar 
to other social ﬁelds, the academic ﬁeld constitutes a realm composed 
4  
 
 
of multiple material and symbolic positions occupied by purposive 
subjects, who, within their relationally structured  spaces  of  action and 
interaction, compete over access to resources, inﬂuence,  status  and – 
ultimately – power. 
(c) The intellectualist predisposition: Owing to their tendency to remain caught up in self-
referential language games, tension-laden dynamics of ideological 
positioning and struggles over symbolic power, their ‘intellectualist bias […] 
entices [them] to construe the world as a spectacle, as a set of signiﬁcations 
to be interpreted rather than as concrete problems to be solved 
practically’.23 Such a scholastic – that is, essentially theoreticist – take on 
reality is deeply problematic in that it can lead social researchers ‘to miss 
entirely the differentia speciﬁca of the logic of practice’24 – that is, of the 
codiﬁed, and largely implicit, patterns that govern empirically unfolding 
actions and interactions, whose ineluctable preponderance is inscribed 
into the daily construction of  social reality. 
 
To be clear, following the inquisitive spirit of Bourdieusian sociology, the cat- 
egorical commitment to the critical exercise of reﬂexivity is ‘neither egocentric nor 
logocentric but quintessentially embedded in, and turned toward, scientiﬁc practice’.25 
If taken seriously, the challenge of ‘epistemic reﬂexivity invites intellectuals to 
recognize and to work to neutralize the speciﬁc determinisms to which their 
innermost thoughts are subjected, and it informs a conception of the craft of 
research designed to strengthen its epistemological moorings’.26 Such a ‘reﬂexive 
turn’,27 therefore, is concerned with facing up to the sociohistorical determinacy of the 
seemingly most autonomous articulations of symbolically mediated claims to 
objective, normative or subjective validity. The different facets of Bourdieu’s 
multi-layered conception of reﬂexivity can be traced in his key writings.28 As shall 
be demonstrated in subsequent sections, twelve dimensions are particularly 
important when seeking to shed light on the principal meanings underpinning 
Bourdieu’s conception of reﬂexivity. 
 
1. Reﬂexivity and science 
The ﬁrst – perhaps, most obvious – element underlying Bourdieu’s conception 
of reﬂexivity is science. Irrespective of which particular discipline one may have in 
mind, social science constitutes a ‘reﬂexive science’.29 Regardless of whether 
one moves within the epistemic horizon of anthropology, economics, politi- 
cal studies, psychology or sociology, genuinely ‘scientiﬁc work’30 within these 
disciplines is inconceivable without their researchers’ willingness to commit 
themselves – albeit, admittedly, to varying degrees – to embarking upon the 
exercise of reﬂexivity. 
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Tautologically speaking, ‘scientiﬁc sociology’31 is a ‘sociological science’.32 
Aware of ‘the social history of  social science’,33 scholars concerned with  ‘the 
sociology of science’34 are confronted with the challenge of  ‘increasing the 
knowledge of the social determinants of sociological thought and, thus, the 
effectiveness of critique’.35 In this sense, reﬂexivity permits researchers to 
become aware of the social embeddedness not only of the knowledge they 
produce but also, more signiﬁcantly, of the epistemic parameters on the basis 
of which their claims to validity are judged and, potentially, applied. Science, 
in the Bourdieusian sense, involves the methodical study of the social 
conditions of production that make systematic forms of knowledge generation 
possible in the ﬁrst place. 
Scientiﬁc endeavours permit those involved in them to explore realities whose 
constitution, functioning and development escape the epistemically limited grasp 
of everyday experience and common sense. Hence, science ‘reveals things that are 
hidden and sometimes repressed’,36 including the fact that the systematic exchange 
of knowledge claims is itself a ‘site of a competition’,37 in which ‘the pursuit of 
speciﬁc proﬁts […], speciﬁc interests’38 and speciﬁc paths – potentially, leading to the 
obtainment of  status and recognition – constitutes  the precondition for, at worst, 
survival and, at best, success within the academic ﬁeld. Rather than succumbing to 
the quasi-mythological force of ‘a scientiﬁc hagiography’,39 sociological reﬂexivity 
obliges  us  to  question  the  validity  of the self-fulﬁlling prophecies that 
dominate the habitualized interactions taking place within the academic ﬁeld. Just 
as symbolic power can be reinforced by institutional mechanisms of 
consecration, ritualization  and  legitimization,  it can be called into question by 
critical processes of reﬂection, investigation and justiﬁcation. Sociological 
reﬂexivity allows for the exposure of the arbitrary nature permeating the criteria 
employed to raise allegedly disinterested claims to validity. 
 
In fact – and this is what makes the particular difficulty of sociology – these 
‘interests’ and ‘passions’, noble or ignoble, lead to scientiﬁc truth only in so far  as 
they are accompanied by a scientiﬁc knowledge of what determines them and of the limits that they set 
on knowledge. […] the more advanced a science is, the greater is the capital of 
knowledge accumulated within it, and the greater the quantity of knowledge that 
subversive and critical strategies, whatever their ‘motivations’, need to mobilize in order 
to be effective.40 
 
Critical social scientists need to mobilize their reﬂexive resources in order to 
unearth the relationally contingent constraints that deﬁne the epistemic scope 
of the conceptual, methodological and empirical tools employed in their 
inquiries. Sociological reﬂexivity permits critical researchers to comprehend 
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the extent to which their production of knowledge is never a disinterested, 
unbiased or neutral affair. To be precise, it enables them to recognize that their 
investigative activity constitutes a social practice whose spatiotemporally vari- 
able direction can be shaped by conservative or subversive, orthodox or heter- 
odox, complicit or rebellious, conformist or dissident strategies. Furthermore, 
it requires them to concede that these strategies are far from straightforward 
insofar as they can be employed consciously or unconsciously, explicitly or 
implicitly, theoretically or practically, deliberately or unwittingly. 
As a ‘truly reﬂexive social science’,41 sociology – understood as a self-critical 
endeavour – must include ‘the sociology of sociology’,42 prepared to ‘guard  itself 
against this epistemocentrism, or this “ethnocentrism of the scientist”, which consists in 
ignoring everything that the analyst injects into his [or her] perception of the 
object by virtue of the fact that he [or she] is placed outside of the object, that he 
[or she] observes it from afar and from above’.43 Guided by a ‘genuine sociological 
reﬂexivity’,44 a ‘genuinely reﬂexive sociology’45 must avoid falling into the trap of 
scholastic  transcendentalism, which gives researchers  the misleading impression 
that they act as disembodied, disconnected and disembedded subjects, whose 
free-ﬂoating minds have the epistemic capacity to generate disinterested, 
unbiased and neutral knowledge. Social science – conceived of as a reﬂexive 
endeavour – ‘is necessarily a “knowledge of a knowledge” and must make room for a 
sociologically grounded phenomenology of the primary experience of the ﬁeld’,46 
that is, for the systematic study of the social conditions of production that make 
the emergence of science possible in the ﬁrst place. Such a ‘sociology of 
sociology’47 is a reﬂexive project that ‘continually turns back onto itself the scientiﬁc weapons 
it produces’.48 As such, it draws attention to the fact that sociological reﬂexivity obliges 
those who endorse it to confront the spatiotemporal variability  permeating  their  
own  claims  to  scientiﬁcity.  By means of multiple conceptual, methodological 
and empirical tools, social researchers are in a position to scrutinize the relational 
determinacy of human reality, including the contingency that pervades both 
ordinary and scientiﬁc affirmations of validity. 
To be sure, for Bourdieu, ‘[t]o adopt the point of view of reﬂexivity is not  to 
renounce objectivity’,49 let alone the claim to scientiﬁcity, but, on the contrary, ‘to give 
it its full generality by questioning the privilege of the knowing subject, arbitrarily 
freed, as purely noetic, from the work of objectivation’.50 Reﬂexive sociology, in 
other words, is the radical transcendence of atomistic versions of the philosophy 
of the subject and the philosophy of consciousness: it reminds us that all forms 
of subjectivity and consciousness are socially situated, socially generated, socially 
reproduced and socially transformed. Hence, ‘the sociology of the social 
determinants of sociological practice’51 teaches us that the ﬁrst  step towards 
emancipating ourselves from the constraining power of  social 
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structures is to recognize and to problematize – rather than to ignore, let alone to 
deny – their existence. The seemingly most self-determined entity capable of  
action, reﬂection and justiﬁcation cannot escape the existential weight of  the 
multiple structural forces exercising the power of social determination. 
Sociological reﬂexivity is about the assertion, rather than the rejection, of sci- 
entiﬁcity to the extent that it succeeds in exposing the relational constitution of 
all material and symbolic dimensions permeating the daily construction of human  
reality.52 
 
2. Reﬂexivity and vigilance 
The second noteworthy element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reﬂexiv- 
ity is vigilance. It is vital to ‘subject the operations of sociological practice to the 
polemics of epistemological reason’,53 thereby cultivating ‘an attitude of vigi- 
lance’54 that permits researchers to develop an ‘adequate knowledge of error’,55 
bias and preconception. Genuinely vigilant investigators are aware of the dis- 
tortive force of misperception, misconception and misrepresentation. The gaze 
of scientiﬁcally motivated minds – although it may be able to challenge the 
doxic illusions of common sense and everyday experience – is limited in terms 
of its epistemological capacity to grapple with the intricacies of reality. 
 
The intention of giving the researcher the means of taking on the oversight of his [or her] own scientiﬁc 
work is quite different from the calls to order by censors whose peremptory 
negativism can only inspire the mortal fear of error and a resigned recourse to a 
technology invested with the function of exorcism.56 
 
To be clear, self-surveillance – in the Bourdieusian sense – is not equivalent to 
supervising one’s own epistemic activities and embodied practices to such an 
extent that scientiﬁc work becomes a stiﬂing exercise of self-paralysis. In fact,  if 
the sociologically motivated ‘philosophy of critical vigilance’57 is converted into a 
default position of self-destructive cynicism, then it is difficult to see  how it is 
possible to make any individually or collectively empowering contributions to 
society by virtue of conceptually sophisticated and empirically substantiated 
inquiries into the constitution, functioning and development of reality. Sociological 
vigilance requires ‘the “psychoanalysis of the scientiﬁc mind” ’:58 
 
the ‘psychoanalysis of the scientiﬁc mind’ is taken further by an analysis of the social conditions in 
which sociological works are produced: the sociologist may ﬁnd an exceptionally valuable 
instrument of epistemological vigilance in the sociology of knowledge, a means of enhancing and 
clarifying knowledge of error and the conditions that make it possible and 
sometimes inevitable.59 
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Reﬂexive sociology, then, is the attempt to problematize the social conditions 
of production shaping both the daily construction and the systematic study of 
human reality. Put differently, professional researchers are no less embedded 
in and inﬂuenced by relationally constituted – and, thus, historically 
contingent – circumstances than ordinary people. 
Sociological investigators have access to conceptual and methodological 
tools, by means of which they are able to examine the constitution, function- 
ing and development of reality. Unlike ordinary actors, who are primarily 
motivated by common sense and who make judgments on the basis of their 
everyday experiences, social researchers are equipped with the epistemic 
capacity to distance themselves not only from their object of study but also 
from themselves. Reﬂexivity, conceived of in terms of vigilance, permits socio- 
logical researchers to scrutinize their own position, as well as their own posi- 
tioning, in the social universe. 
Far from constituting a pristine realm of neutral and unbiased interactions, the 
scientiﬁc ﬁeld is no less value-laden, meaning-laden, perspective-laden, interest-laden, power-laden 
and tension-laden than other social ﬁelds. Notwithstanding the functional speciﬁcity 
of the social ﬁeld in which they ﬁnd themselves immersed in a particular – that 
is, spatiotemporally contingent – context, both individual and collective actors 
are divided by  the unequal distribution of, as well as by  the asymmetrically 
structured access to, material and symbolic resources. 
The act of ‘epistemological reﬂection’60 stands for an exercise of constant 
vigilance, enabling the  sociologist to  analyse the  ‘social conditions of  his  [or 
her] sociological practice and his [or her] relation to sociology’61 with the  aim of  
grasping his or her own relational determinacy, which stems from his or her 
immersion in a relationally constructed – and, therefore, ceaselessly changing – 
reality. Understood in these terms, reﬂexivity is ‘the precondition for his [or her] 
making his [or her] unconscious presuppositions explicit and for a more complete 
internalization  of  a  more  adequate  epistemology’.62  To  recognize the link 
between sociological reﬂexivity and epistemological vigilance means to face up to 
the fact that the sociologist operates within and through – rather than outside, let alone 
above – society. In other words, we need to consider the far-reaching implications 
of  the sociologist’s social embeddedness:63 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental presupposition that the sociologist owes to the fact that he 
[or she] is a social subject is the presupposition of the absence of presuppositions which 
deﬁnes ethnocentrism; the sociologist (more than the ethnologist) is vulnerable to the illusion of 
immediate self-evidence or the temptation to unconsciously universalize particular experience when he [or she] forgets 
that he [or she] is the cultivated subject of a particular culture and fails to subordinate his practice to a continuous 
questioning of this relationship.64 
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Critiques of and attacks on ethnocentrism need to be ‘constantly revived and 
reinterpreted by epistemological vigilance’,65 in order to ensure that ritualized 
dogmatism, canonized ideologism and codiﬁed close-mindedness are chal- 
lenged by openness to argument, enthusiasm for debate and acceptance of 
contradiction. A sociology without vigilance and reﬂexivity would be tanta- 
mount to a social science incapable of acknowledging its relationally constituted  
determinacy.66 
 
3. Reﬂexivity and consciousness 
The third striking element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reﬂexivity is 
consciousness. This facet is expressed in the view that the exercise of sociological 
reﬂexivity requires an approach comparable to that of psychoanalysis: ‘the 
“psychoanalysis of  the scientiﬁc mind”’,67 including ‘the sociological mind’,68  is 
crucial to exploring the researcher’s unconscious, comprising his or her ‘unconscious 
presuppositions’69 – regardless of whether they are shaped predominantly by social, 
cultural, economic, political or ideological factors. On this account, social science 
is ‘a science of the unconscious’,70 that is, ‘an objective archaeology of our unconscious’,71 which 
serves the function of ‘the instrument of a genuine socioanalysis’.72 Social science 
can be conceived of as ‘a social critique’73 capable of uncovering the hidden causal 
forces that govern the development of behavioural and ideological patterns and, 
consequently, people’s everyday immersion in, and construction of,  reality. 
If effective, psychoanalysis may enable individuals to overcome obstacles 
generated by mental pathologies that put a strain on their quotidian existence,  as 
reﬂected in different forms of  depression or paralysis. In a similar vein, to the 
degree that it is anchored in day-to-day practices, social critique may permit both 
small-scale and large-scale communities to cope with dysfunctionalities produced 
by interactional pathologies that limit the possibilities of human empowerment, 
owing to the detrimental effects of outcome-oriented and systemically steered 
rationalization. What is needed is ‘a reﬂexive return to its own practice’74 and, 
paradoxically, to ‘a social unconscious within the analysis’75 of the social. To be 
sociologically conscious, in the Bourdieusian sense, means to be prepared to accept 
that, in order for a critical social science to come into existence, its defenders 
need to admit that ‘an epistemological reﬂection upon its practices is inseparable from a 
political reﬂection upon both its effects and its function’.76 To the extent that science 
– because it is a value-laden, meaning-laden, perspective-laden, interest-laden, 
power-laden and tension-laden endeavour – is far from neutral or disinterested, 
it requires that its participants and defenders be conscious not only of the 
unconscious of the actors they examine but also of  their own  unconscious. 
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What has to be constantly scrutinized and neutralized, in the very act of construction of the 
object, is the collective scientiﬁc unconscious embedded in theories, problems, and 
(especially national) categories of scholarly judgment […]. It follows that the 
subject of reﬂexivity must ultimately be the social scientiﬁc ﬁeld in toto.77 
 
Sociologically informed reﬂexivity is inconceivable with the consciousness of 
one’s own unconscious, the awareness of one’s own unawareness, the (re-) con- 
ceptualization of one’s own preconceptions and the attempt to make judgments 
about one’s own prejudgments. In short, ‘the historical critique of unconscious 
presuppositions’78 is vital if one is willing to recognize that ‘the mystical ambi- 
tion to reach the essence in a single leap’79 needs to be abandoned in favour of 
‘the patient reconstruction of genesis’,80 thereby exposing the potential for the 
constant transformation of the social world, including the continuous reﬁne- 
ment of the conceptual and methodological tools employed to study, and to 
make sense of, it.81 
 
4. Reﬂexivity and self-awareness 
The fourth signiﬁcant element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reﬂex- 
ivity is self-awareness. The centrality of this dimension is synthesized in the 
Bourdieusian emphasis on ‘self-reﬂexivity’,82 which may be regarded as an 
indispensable component of critical sociology. A truly critical sociologist needs 
to ‘subject his [or her] own questioning to sociological questioning’,83 thereby 
demonstrating a capacity to convert his or her inquiry into a source of self- 
reﬂexivity. Thus, ‘the reﬂexive return to the subjective experience of the social 
world’84 lies at the core of ‘the objectiﬁcation of the objective conditions of 
that experience’.85 Sociohistorically contingent arrangements shape the mani- 
fold ways in which subjects perceive, appreciate and act upon the world. All 
researchers, irrespective of the degree of their conceptual and methodologi- 
cal sophistication, are ordinary actors. As such, they need to grapple with the 
relationally assembled determinacy not only of their object of inquiry but also 
of their own analytical gaze, which is located within an embodied – and, 
hence, dispositionally structured – cognitive entity, concerned with the system- 
atic exploration of reality. 
In light of this commitment to conceiving of reﬂexivity in terms of self- 
awareness, ‘the game of the inaugural lecture on the inaugural lecture’,86 
understood as the critic’s willingness to criticize himself or herself, is crucial 
to the very possibility of developing a sociology whose examination of reality 
involves the study of its own constitution as a discipline and, thus, of its own 
claims to validity. A self-reﬂexive discourse is ‘a discourse that conceives of 
itself as an object’,87 that is, as an object of contemplation whose signiﬁcance 
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comes to the fore through sociology’s ‘reﬂexive return’88 in relation to itself. 
Such a discourse obliges us to call the allegedly privileged position of the 
‘knowing subject’89 into question: sociologically reﬂexive subjects are aware of 
the objective, normative and subjective aspects that shape – if not, determine – 
their multifactorially structured – and, hence, constantly shifting – place in the 
world. A ‘sociology of sociology’,90 in the genuinely reﬂexive sense, is a sociol- 
ogy of the determinants of sociological practice. Reﬂexive sociology converts 
‘its own functioning’91 into an object of inquiry, thereby making a case for a 
form of scientiﬁcity based on the critical awareness of the limitations perme- 
ating its own epistemic activities. In a Bourdieusian sense, there is no sociologi- 
cal reﬂexivity without the self-awareness of those who embrace the challenge of 
scrutinizing the relational constitution of human realities. The capacity to 
develop ‘a point of view on a point of view’92 is vital to the construction of a 
critical attitude motivated by self-awareness and reﬂexivity.93 
 
5. Reﬂexivity and critique 
The ﬁfth signiﬁcant element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of  reﬂexivity is 
critique. The critique of critique is an indispensable component of sociological 
reﬂexivity insofar as it permits – and, indeed, compels – the critic to criticize  the 
existence of behavioural, ideological or institutional patterns whose legitimacy is 
objectively, normatively or subjectively questionable. Yet, reﬂexivity –  in the 
Bourdieusian sense – requires not only the critique of different facets of social 
reality but also the critique of the criticizing gaze itself. In short, social critique is 
inconceivable without self-critique.94 The schizophrenic nature of sociological 
critique95 consists in the fact that it needs to include itself in the realm of  the 
criticized in order to be genuinely critical. Otherwise, it would lead to the 
pretentious assumption that the critic stands over and above society, rather than 
being immersed within and dependent upon it. Critical sociology cannot do 
without the sociology of critique,96 because there is no radical way of uncovering, 
let alone problematizing,  the  contradictions  of social life without recognizing 
that sociological analysis – since it is undertaken by spatiotemporally embedded, 
positionally divided and dispositionally equipped actors – forms part of  these 
contradictions, rather than being able to rise above them. 
It is possible to conceive of ‘the sociologist [as] a social worker’97 in the 
sense that, if he or she is motivated by a normative mission, his or her work 
can contribute not only to the empowerment of other individual or collective 
actors, but also to his or her own empowerment. The ability to step back from 
both one’s external world and one’s internal world is vital to the very 
possibility of sociological reﬂexivity, giving sociologically inspired actors the 
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opportunity to criticize – and, thus, to challenge – mechanisms of disempow- 
erment and domination, whilst exploring resources that can be mobilized in 
the pursuit of human empowerment and emancipation.98 
 
6. Reﬂexivity  and self-objectiﬁcation 
The sixth major element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reﬂexivity is self- 
objectiﬁcation. From a Bourdieusian perspective, it is essential for the researcher to 
‘objectify the objectifying distance and the social conditions that make it possible, such as 
the externality of the observer’.99 Every observer – no matter how removed, 
isolated or free-ﬂoating his or her perceptions, appreciations and actions may 
appear – is a sociohistorically situated entity, occupying multiple positions in different 
realms of interaction and developing multiple dispositions in relation to relationally 
constructed environments. To be sure, whilst a sociological inquiry may be 
conducted from ‘a viewpoint away from the stage on which the action is played 
out’,100 researchers are always  already  immersed within particular scenes of 
individual and collective performances  encountered in their own everyday lives. 
Indeed, critical investigators are shaped by key sociological variables – such as 
class, ethnicity, gender, age and ability – to no lesser extent than the actors whose 
material and symbolic practices they scrutinize within their  studies. 
From a Bourdieusian perspective, ‘every genuine sociological undertaking’101 
is inextricably linked to the exercise of ‘a socioanalysis’,102 that is, to the possibility 
of objectifying the objectifying gaze itself. Indeed, ‘the objectiﬁcation of objectivity’103 – 
including the objectiﬁcation of those who seek to objectify particular aspects of 
objectivity – allows for ‘a genuine self-reappropriation’104 to  the degree that it 
enables researchers to regard themselves – both consciously and critically – as 
spatiotemporally situated and embodied actors, who are no less inﬂuenced by the 
power of social structures than those whose lives they examine. 
It is vital ‘to objectify objectiﬁcation’105 in order to generate truly reﬂexive 
forms of sociological investigation: for without ‘a critical objectiﬁcation’106 of ‘the 
epistemological and social conditions’107 that undergird speciﬁc human – including 
academic and scientiﬁc – performances, it is impossible to grasp the extent to 
which theoretical, explicit and conscious forms of engagement with reality are 
preceded by actors’ practical, implicit and unconscious immersion within it. Put 
differently, ‘to objectivize the objectivizing point of view of the sociologist’108 
means ‘to objectivize his [or her] position in the universe of cultural 
production’109 and, thus, in the entire sphere of human constructions.  In other 
words, ‘reﬂexivity conceived of as the task of the scientiﬁc objectiﬁcation of  the 
objectifying subject’110 constitutes an integral component of a
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sociology that is critical not only of others but also of itself, that is, not only of 
the researched but also of the researchers themselves.111 
 
7. Reﬂexivity and distance-taking 
The seventh core element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reﬂexivity is 
distance-taking. One of the principal challenges for the reﬂexive sociologist is ‘to 
reconcile attachment to the mysteries of internality with the imperatives of 
distanciation’.112 This task has two – seemingly opposed – dimensions. 
 
• On the one hand, reﬂexive sociologists’ motivation, imagination and inspi- 
ration are inconceivable without their capacity to wonder about the inﬁnite 
intricacies of the social world, their willingness to continue to be surprised 
by the hidden forces shaping the daily construction of human reality and – 
if necessary – their readiness to express a sense of incredulity when trying to 
make sense of social constellations, especially of those constellations whose 
constitution, development and functioning are not immediately obvious. 
• On the other hand, reﬂexive sociologists’ perceptiveness, thoughtfulness and 
insightfulness rest upon their ability to describe, to analyse, to interpret, to 
explain and to assess the unlimited complexities of the social world, their 
attempt to uncover the underlying determinants of human reality and – if 
required – their preparedness to take a step back when examining particu- 
lar sets of cultural arrangements, particularly if they happen to possess a 
sense of native familiarity with a given sphere or aspect of a relationally 
constructed entity. 
 
In short, we are confronted with the dialectics of interiority and exteriority, 
immanence and transcendence, enchantment and disenchantment, attach- 
ment and detachment, participation and observation, closeness and remote- 
ness, proximity and distance. 
Reﬂexivity represents an exercise of distance-taking: whilst recognizing every human 
actor’s ineluctable situatedness in reality, it permits the sociologist to embark upon 
the journey of critical inquiry by employing conceptual and methodological tools 
designed to scrutinize and to objectify different ﬁelds of sociality. Hence, ‘the controlled 
and conscious construction of his [or her] distance from the real and his [or her] action to the 
real’113 is a prerequisite for the pursuit and defence of a ‘reﬂexive science’.114 For 
without the awareness of the epistemic gap between ordinary belief, common sense and 
everyday experience, on the one hand, and scholarly knowledge, conceptually and methodologically sophisticated 
investigation and empirically substantiated theorization, on the other, there is no point in insisting 
on the scientiﬁcity of  sociology.115  Role-speciﬁc distance-taking116  forms an enriching  
ingredient  of 
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everyday life, expressing actors’ ability to step back – if only temporarily – from 
their immediate immersion in particular domains of society. At the same time, it 
constitutes an indispensable element of reﬂexive scientiﬁc analysis, conveying a 
researcher’s capacity to take – if only transitionally – an objectifying perspective 
aimed at the examination of relationally constructed realities.117 
 
8. Reﬂexivity and rupture 
The eighth central element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reﬂexivity is 
rupture. Reﬂexive sociology, in the Bourdieusian sense, requires the researcher to 
undertake a double-epistemological rupture: ﬁrst, the break with the ordinary 
vision of the world; and, second, the break with the scholastic vision of the 
world.118 ‘The former reaffirms the scientiﬁc nature of reﬂexive sociology; the 
latter emphasises the social embeddedness of reﬂexive sociology.’119 This 
double-epistemological rupture is paradoxical in the sense that it obliges us to 
call ‘the two very conditions of reﬂexive thought’120 into question: namely, ‘the 
being-in-the-world and the being-beyond-the-world’121 of reﬂexive researchers, 
that is, their simultaneous immanence and transcendence. Insofar as they are 
immersed in reality, they are constrained by the limitations imposed upon them 
by objective, normative and subjective patterns of material and symbolic forms 
of structurality. Insofar as they can step back from reality, they are in a position 
to identify, to problematize and – if necessary – to challenge the taken-for- 
grantedness of the givenness that permeates an actor’s participation in the per- 
formative – and, to a large extent, routinized – construction of everydayness. 
The double-epistemological rupture endorsed by reﬂexive sociology serves 
two – aforementioned – basic functions: the break with ordinary conceptions of the 
world and the break with scholastic conceptions of the world. The former 
constitutes a radical epistemological rupture with cognitive dispositions and 
predispositions based on conventional belief, common sense and everyday experience. The latter 
stands for a radical epistemological rupture with cognitive dispositions and 
predispositions founded on the skholè,122 that is, on ‘the privileged scholastic 
situation of freedom from necessity, which allows scholastic thinkers to produce 
scholastic  thought’.123 
In relation to the ﬁrst epistemological break, it is essential to examine the 
relationship between ordinary knowledge and scientiﬁc knowledge.124 The distinction between these 
two types of knowledge rests on ﬁve central epistemological presuppositions:125 
 
(a) A distinction can be drawn between ordinary knowledge and scientiﬁc 
knowledge: they represent two fundamentally different epistemic levels of 
engaging with and making sense of reality. 
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(b) A hierarchy can be established between ordinary knowledge and scientiﬁc 
knowledge: the latter is  epistemically  superior  to  the  former  insofar  as its 
conceptually sophisticated, methodologically regulated, empirically 
substantiated and intellectually mediated reﬂexivity rises above  the  doxically 
distorted horizon of conventional belief, common sense and everyday  
experience. 
(c) A fundamental difference in terms of priority can be discerned with regard to 
the relationship between ordinary knowledge and scientiﬁc knowledge: by 
virtue of both theoretically and practically empowering investigative tools, 
the latter has the enlightening mission to uncover, to demystify and to 
challenge the misconceptions, misrepresentations and misinterpretations 
generated within the epistemically limited realm of the former. 
(d) A key dissimilarity with respect to their social functionality characterizes the 
relationship between ordinary knowledge and scientiﬁc knowledge: one of 
the primary functions of the former is to make social order possible by 
equipping human entities with the ability to draw upon taken-for-granted 
assumptions when interacting with their natural and cultural environments; 
by contrast, one of the principal functions of the latter is to scrutinize – 
that is, (i) to describe, (ii) to analyse, (iii) to interpret, (iv) to explain  and 
(v) to assess – the consolidation, reproduction and transformation of social 
order by unearthing the praxeological power of symbolically codiﬁed and 
materially anchored interactions. 
(e) A structural asymmetry lies at the core of the relationship between ordinary 
knowledge and scientiﬁc knowledge: the epistemological discrepancy 
between these two forms of knowledge is due to the profound positional 
gap between ordinary subjects, whose actions are, to a large extent, guided 
by doxic preconceptions derived from everyday experiences and reﬂexive 
social scientists, whose task is to shed light on the extent to which quotidian 
practices are regulated by common sense and, therefore, by effective – 
but, ultimately, misleading – modes of meaning construction. On this 
account, the positional gap between epistemically unprivileged laypersons 
and epistemically privileged experts permeates the entire universe of 
structurally differentiated knowledge production. 
 
In relation to the second epistemological break, it is crucial to consider the nature 
of scholastic thought. Ten fallacies can be identiﬁed to demonstrate that scholastic 
thought represents a profoundly problematic mode of attributing meaning  to 
reality:126 
 
(a) Scholastic theoreticism: Scholastic thought is theoreticist in that it is based on 
‘theoretical  reason’,  rather  than  ‘practical  reason’.127  As  such,  it remains 
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caught up in the self-sufficient intellectual exercise of  producing theory   for 
the sake of, and only in relation to, theory,  instead of  recognizing –    let 
alone engaging with – the socio-ontological preponderance of everyday 
practices.128 
(b) Scholastic intellectualism: Scholastic thought is intellectualist in that it is based on 
‘intellectual reason’, rather than ‘socially committed reason’. As such, it 
permits intellectuals to create a ‘theodicy of their own privilege’,129 removed 
from the real-world urgencies of both the under- and the non-privileged.130 
(c) Scholastic universalism: Scholastic thought is universalist in that it is based on the 
idea of ‘universal reason’, rather than ‘particular reason’. As such, it makes 
claims to ‘universal validity’, ‘universal legitimacy’ and ‘universal 
authority’,131 which – by deﬁnition – rise above the spatiotemporal 
speciﬁcity of relationally constructed realities.132 
(d) Scholastic rationalism: Scholastic thought is rationalist in that it is based on the 
idea of ‘reasoning reason’, rather than ‘reasonable reason’. As such,  it 
hinges on the assumption that reason, rather than bodily experience, 
determines how humans engage with and attach meaning to the world, 
thereby succumbing to the ‘illusion of (intellectual) mastery of oneself that 
is so deeply ingrained in intellectuals’,133 whilst failing to face up to the 
sociohistorical contingency of all forms of human rationality.134 
(e) Scholastic transcendentalism: Scholastic thought is transcendentalist in that it is based 
on the idea of ‘transcendental reason’, rather than ‘immanent reason’. As 
such, it is driven by ‘the illusion of the transcendence of transhistorical and 
transpersonal reason’,135 capable of escaping the historical and personal 
constraints to which those who invented, and keep inventing, it are 
exposed as spatiotemporally situated, physically constituted, as well as 
both dispositionally and positionally divided actors.136 
(f) Scholastic purism:   Scholastic  thought  is  purist in that it is based on  the  idea 
of ‘pure reason’, rather than ‘possible reason’. As such, it is motivated by 
the myth of the existence of a ‘pure subject’ equipped with the capacity 
to generate ‘pure knowledge’137 about itself and the world by which it is 
surrounded, instead of conceding that ‘[t]he possibility of purity is built 
upon the impurity of possibility’.138 Put differently, it falls short of admitting 
that claims to epistemic purity constitute futile attempts to cover up every 
human subject’s conscious or unconscious complicity in the construction 
of value-laden, meaning-laden, perspective-laden, interest-laden, power- 
laden and tension-laden realities.139 
(g) Scholastic foundationalism: Scholastic thought is foundationalist in that it is based 
on the idea of ‘foundational reason’, rather than ‘historical reason’. As 
such, it rests on the self-referential assumption that the foundations of 
reason are to be found in and through, rather than outside of, reason. 
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Paradoxically, however, it is perhaps on condition that reason is subjected 
to the test of the most radical historicization, in particular by destroying 
the illusion of foundation by recalling the arbitrariness of beginnings and by 
historical and sociological critique of the instruments of historical and soci- 
ological science itself, that one can hope to save it from arbitrariness and 
historical relativization.140 
[We need] to sacriﬁce the anxiety over the ultimate foundation to the historical critique 
of unconscious presuppositions, to repudiate the mystical ambition to reach 
the essence in a single leap in favor of  the patient reconstruction   of 
genesis.141 
 
To the degree that reason is unavoidably embedded in the ‘social founda- 
tions’142 of human existence, the philosophical project of ‘foundationalist 
rationalism’ or ‘rationalist foundationalism’ needs to be replaced by the 
sociological project of ‘historical rationalism’ or ‘rationalist historicism’.143 
(h) Scholastic neutralism: Scholastic thought is neutralist in that it is based on the 
idea of  ‘neutral reason’,  rather  than ‘interested reason’.  As such, it aims to 
portray interestedness as disinterestedness.  Yet, to the extent  that  all forms 
of knowledge are – unavoidably – value-laden (Erkenntnisnormativität), perspective-
laden (Erkenntnisstandpunkt), interest-laden (Erkenntnisfunktion), power-laden 
(Erkenntniskampf) and purpose-laden (Erkenntnisnutzung), the illusion of 
neutrality evaporates in the face of the social contingency permeating all 
claims to epistemic validity. The most abstract form of rationality cannot 
bypass the social power of normativity, positionality, functionality,  
conﬂictuality  and  instrumentality.   Insofar  as  every  theory of cognition 
(Erkenntnistheorie) is derived from a practice of cognition (Erkenntnispraxis), 
there is no such thing as a disinterested form of reasoning.144 
(i) Scholastic autonomism: Scholastic thought is autonomist in that it is based on the 
idea of ‘autonomous reason’, rather than ‘dependent reason’. As such, it 
reinforces the autonomization of reason on two levels: on the symbolic 
level, scholastic thought asserts its independence from ostensibly inferior 
facets of meaning production, notably those that are situated outside the 
realm of philosophy, that is, outside the empire of the queen of knowledge; 
on the material level, scholastic thought declares its independence from the 
mundane – notably, physical – dimensions of reality, which it seeks to 
transcend by virtue of its claims to rationally grounded autonomy. 
 
Those who are immersed, in some cases from birth, in scholastic universes 
resulting from a long process of autonomization are led to forget the exceptional 
historical and social conditions that make possible a view of  the world and 
of  cultural products that is characterized by self-evidence and naturalness.145 
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Whilst concealing its material dependence upon necessity through relative 
symbolic independence, scholastic thought hides its symbolic dependence 
upon necessity through relative material independence.146 
(j) Scholastic hegemonism: Scholastic thought is hegemonist in that it is based 
on the idea  of  ‘philosophical  reason’,  rather  than  ‘sociological  reason’. 
As such, it is aimed  at  occupying  a  position  of  ultimate  hegemony  in the 
sphere of knowledge. This objective manifests itself in ‘the age-old battle of 
philosophy against sociology’.147 Sociology means to philosophy what science 
means to religion: ‘a threat to the self-declared ultimate authority  of  an  
arbitrary  historical authority’.148   Whereas philosophy has always been 
substantially shaped by attempts to make claims to universally defensible 
validity (Gültigkeit), the whole point of doing sociology is to insist on the 
contextually contingent preponderance of sociality (Gesellschaftlichkeit) 
pervading all human engagements with reality (Wirklichkeit).149 
 
In short, ‘the hegemonic ambition’150 of scholastic thought can be conceived 
of as an expression of the philosophically inspired quest for theory, intellec- 
tuality, universality, rationality, transcendentality, purity, foundationality, neu- 
trality and autonomy. It is the task of sociological reﬂexivity to unmask the 
illusory nature of the scholastic desire to step outside the horizon of relation- 
ally constructed realities. 
The break with ordinary conceptions of the world  and the break with 
scholastic conceptions of the world constitute two irreducible components  of 
the social-scientiﬁc attempt to engage critically with  reality:  reﬂexive social 
researchers need to aim for both sufficient theoretical distance to question people’s 
common-sense representations of reality and sufficient practical proximity to 
account for the empirical weight of people’s immersion in society.151 
 
9. Reﬂexivity and epistemology 
The ninth central element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of  reﬂexivity is 
epistemology. To be exact, reﬂexivity – in the Bourdieusian sense – forms part of 
a social epistemology. As such, it pursues the project of  a ‘sociology of 
knowledge’,152 which – by deﬁnition – consists in ‘relativizing the validity of  
knowledge’153 and, hence, in shattering any illusions about the possibility of  
developing an epistemology capable of  demonstrating the existence of free-
ﬂoating symbolic forms. To recognize that ‘the sociology of sociology’154 is  
inconceivable  without  ‘the  sociology of  sociological knowledge’155 
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requires accepting that every claim to epistemic validity takes place within a 
spatiotemporally contingent realm of sociality. From a Bourdieusian perspec- 
tive, there is no epistemology without reﬂexivity, just as there is no reﬂexivity 
without epistemology. 
Challenging ‘the theological or terrorist use of the canonical writings’,156 a 
truly reﬂexive epistemology permits the researcher to draw upon ‘the effective- 
ness of critique’157 with the aim of exposing not only the social determinants 
of human action but also the ‘social determinants of sociological thought’158 
itself. Considering the ‘social history of the sociology of science’,159 it is vital 
not to fall into the trap of ‘providing cognitive tools that can be turned back 
on the subject of the cognition’.160 If epistemological devices turn out to be 
anti-epistemological, this implies that they defeat the whole point of socio- 
logical inquiry, which is to generate knowledge with, within and for – rather 
than without, outside and against – society. To the degree that we are willing to 
unearth the ‘social grounds’161 of knowledge – that is, of both ordinary and 
scientiﬁc ways of grasping particular aspects of reality –, we need to be pre- 
pared ‘to historicize the subject of historicization [and] objectify the subject 
of objectiﬁcation’.162 
Epistemology, understood in sociological terms, involves the effort to gain 
‘knowledge of its historical presuppositions’,163 that is, of the social conditions of 
production in whose context subjects capable of cognition and action operate. 
Thus, the reason ‘[w]hy the social sciences must take themselves as their object’164 
is that the defence of a self-critical epistemology is a precondition for the 
possibility of pursuing a reﬂexive sociology. Hence, ‘sociologists have to convert 
reﬂexivity into a disposition constitutive of their scientiﬁc habitus, that is, into a 
reﬂexive reﬂexivity, capable of acting not ex post, on the opus operatum, but a priori, on the 
modus operandi’.165 By so doing, they can contribute to creating a sociology whose 
epistemology is as reﬂexive as its reﬂexivity is epistemological. Within the 
epistemological horizon of reﬂexive sociology, there is no place for narcissism or 
self-complacency, because it is motivated by the ambition to shed light on the 
intimate link between the production of knowledge and the construction of  
society.166 
 
10. Reﬂexivity and historicization 
The tenth chief element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reﬂexivity is his- 
toricization. One of the main tasks faced by reﬂexive research is to explore the 
‘historical and social conditions under which sociological practice is accom- 
plished’,167 including the practices of ordinary actors in their everyday lives. 
Every social performance is historically situated. It is possible to make sense of 
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the historicity that permeates worldly realities by focusing on different levels of 
analysis, notably the following: 
 
• on the objective level, history can be conceived of as a naturally constituted 
process, founded on physically organized occurrences; 
• on the normative level, history can be interpreted as a culturally constituted 
process, shaped by socially constructed occurrences; 
• on the subjective level, history can be considered a psychologically constituted 
process, derived from mentally projected occurrences. 
 
However one wishes to conceptualize historicity,  one  cannot  deny  the  temporal 
– and, hence, transient – composition pervading all – including the seemingly most 
consolidated – forms of sociality. Thus, ‘to historicize the subject of 
historicization’168 means to reconstruct ‘the genealogy’169 of socially assembled 
realities, comprising both ordinary and scientiﬁc attempts to make sense of their 
temporal contingency. A ‘reﬂexive historico-sociological analysis of  science’170 is the 
epistemological precondition for acquiring ‘knowledge of   its historical 
presuppositions’,171 that is, of the sets of principles, criteria and assumptions on 
the basis of which researchers establish an investigative relation to the aspects of 
reality that they aim to study. Put differently, ‘all social scientists should 
contextualize themselves by going through a process of sociological self-analysis or 
rigorous epistemological vigilance’.172 For without the ‘historical critique of  unconscious 
presuppositions’173 it is impossible to account  for the pivotal role that 
hermeneutically constituted – and, hence, constantly shifting – background 
horizons play in the construction of  meaning. There is no comprehensive form 
of sociological reﬂexivity without the researcher’s awareness of  his or her 
situatedness in  history: 
 
Through the sociologist, a historically situated historical agent and socially 
determined social subject, history – that is, the society in which the existing 
remains of history are present – turns for a moment back on itself, and reﬂects 
on itself; and, through the sociologist, all social agents are able to know a little 
more clearly what they are and what they are doing.174 
 
Given the temporality that permeates all forms of worldly reality, including 
epistemic attempts to capture particular aspects shaping the constitution of 
society, it is one of the key functions of sociological reﬂexivity to draw 
attention to the fact that there is no such thing as a transcendental mode  of 
human agency capable of escaping its embeddedness in the horizon of 
historicity.175 
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11. Reﬂexivity and understanding 
The eleventh fundamental element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of 
reﬂexivity is understanding. In this context, it is both possible and useful to dis- 
tinguish three principal levels of understanding (comprendre or Verstehen), all of 
which are vital to the possibility of  sociological  reﬂexivity: 
 
• understanding in the cognitive sense of comprehending something (Verstehen 
eines  Tatbestandes); 
• understanding in the intersubjective sense of  comprehending  someone  
else’s assertions (Verstehen einer Aussage); and 
• understanding in the empathetic sense of comprehending someone else’s 
motives, feelings or situation (Verstehen eines Mitmenschen).176 
 
Put differently,  sociological  reﬂexivity  – in the Bourdieusian  sense  – comprises a 
tripartite challenge: the ability to grapple with (a) objective, (b) intersubjective and 
(c) subjective dimensions of reality. In effect, the conceptual differentiation between 
these three spheres of existence is somewhat arbitrary: ‘objectivity is 
intersubjectivity’177 to the extent that, in order to acquire social recognition, it 
requires ‘intersubjective validation’;178 objectivity is subjectivity to the extent that,  in 
order to obtain personal legitimacy, it needs to receive subjective  validation. Such a 
constructivist conception of the world ‘is opposed to any form of realism seeking 
to ground truth in “the match between the thing and the spirit” ’,179 that is, in a 
correspondence between reality and representation and, thus, in a homology 
between ‘the way things are’ and ‘the way things are thought to be’.180 The 
Bourdieusian challenge, then, consists in exposing the social constructedness of  human  
reality  in  general  and  of  symbolic  representations  in  particular.181 In order to 
comprehend the sociological role of human modes of understanding, we need to 
examine the social factors shaping our symbolically mediated engagement with the 
physical, cultural and personal realms of our existence. 
Far from being reducible to a monolithic affair, the intimate link between 
reﬂexivity and understanding needs to be studied in terms of  the multiple 
dimensions permeating both ordinary people’s and social researcher’s 
attempts to attribute meaning to reality. Yet, it is the intersubjectivist constitution of 
human understanding that deserves particular attention: 
 
to situate oneself at the point where the author was situated, at the point that he [or 
she] occupied within the social world and from which he [or she] viewed the world; 
to place oneself at that point means to adopt the point of view on the world that is his [or hers], 
to understand it as he [or she] understood it, and so, in a sense, to justify it.182 
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On this account, reﬂexivity that is oriented towards understanding is tantamount 
to a perspective-taking exercise: our capacity to look at the world from the viewpoint 
of others forms an indispensable component of our ability to develop a sense of 
empathy as well as, at a more fundamental level, a sense of morality. There is no 
comprehensive understanding of human reality without recognition of the fact 
that we, as moral entities, are equipped with the capacity to put ourselves in the 
shoes of others. Put differently, sociological reﬂexivity is inconceivable without 
the ability to see things through the eyes of our fellow human beings by virtue of 
empathy. It is by learning to communicate  with others that we learn to attribute 
meaning both to our external world and  to our internal world. Given the 
tripartite constitution of our simultaneous immersion in the physical, cultural and 
personal realms of our lives, the objective, normative and subjective dimensions 
of our existence are inextricably intertwined. Reﬂexive  sociology,  then, 
constitutes ‘a resource to understand  the world’183 that surrounds us and, indeed, 
a resource through which we can seek to understand the nature of  understanding 
itself.184 
 
12. Reﬂexivity and emancipation 
The twelfth central element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reﬂexivity 
is emancipation.185 ‘Returning to people the meaning of their actions’,186 thereby 
‘learning to know oneself, to situate oneself, to reﬂect upon one’s position’187 
and, thus, to become aware of both the resources of empowerment and the 
sources of disempowerment – all of these aspirations were amongst 
‘Bourdieu’s strong demands’,188 inspired by his ambition to develop a sociol- 
ogy guided by the constant exercise of reﬂexivity. To be sure, ‘[t]he knowledge 
of determinisms’189 – irrespective of whether they are, primarily, of material 
or symbolic, behavioural or ideological, empirical or representational nature – 
can contribute ‘to liberty and to action’,190 both of which constitute indis- 
pensable ingredients of emancipatory forms of transformation. In this way, 
sociology can be converted into an ‘instrument of liberation’,191 but without 
thereby ascribing ‘the role of the liberating hero’192 to the sociologist, as if he 
or she were the enlightener of the to-be-enlightened. Rather, it is the task of 
sociology to provide conceptual and methodological tools by means of which 
it becomes possible not only to uncover and to challenge mechanisms of domi- 
nation but also to allude to the possibility of creating social conditions allow- 
ing for processes of both individual and collective emancipation. 
 
I too sometimes wonder if the completely transparent and disenchanted social 
universe that would be produced by a social science that was fully developed 
(and widely diffused, if that could ever be the case) would not be impossible to 
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live in. I think, all the same, that social relations would be much less unhappy if 
people at least understood the mechanisms that lead them to contribute to their 
own deprivation.193 
 
In light of  the previous reﬂection, we are confronted with a curious paradox.  On 
the one hand, a human universe that is utterly shaped – if not, controlled – by 
social-scientiﬁc knowledge is not necessarily a viable, let alone a desirable, option 
for the construction of a society capable of escaping the constraining force of 
systemically driven determinacy. On the other hand, a world whose development 
is dictated by mechanisms of domination, rather than by processes of  
emancipation, can be challenged by  exploring the civilizational role of  our 
species-distinctive potential. In other words, reﬂexive sociologists need  to be both 
realistic and optimistic: they need to be sufficiently realistic to recognize that the 
construction of an entirely emancipated world is not only unviable but also 
undesirable. At the same time, they need to be sufficiently optimistic to insist that 
the construction of a world shaped in accordance with universal human needs, as 
well as on the basis of a fairly distributed access to material and symbolic resources 
for action, is an ideal for which it is worth struggling. 
 
The particularity of sociology is that it takes as its objects ﬁelds of struggle – not only the 
ﬁeld of class struggle but the ﬁeld of scientiﬁc struggles itself. And the sociologist occupies 
a position in these struggles.194 
the more advanced a science is, the greater is the capital of knowledge accumu- 
lated within it and the greater the quality of knowledge that subversive and critical 
strategies, whatever their ‘motivations’, need to mobilize in order to be effective.195 
 
On this view, reﬂexivity is an empowering resource on several counts: 
 
(a) It permits us to conceive of society as an ensemble of ﬁelds and, hence, as a 
set of multiple struggles between asymmetrically positioned individual and 
collective actors.196 
(b) It enables us to conceive of sociology as a discipline located within the scientiﬁc 
ﬁeld and, thus, as an undertaking shaped by both structural and ideological 
modes of position-taking – not only in relation to its own area  of  research 
but also, more generally, in relation to society as a whole.197 
(c) It allows us to use science as a tool, not in order to authorize or to legitimize 
research for the sake of research, but, rather, in order to empower the 
disempowered, give a voice to the voiceless and make visible the invisible.198 
 
From a Bourdieusian perspective, then, ‘the weapons of criticism have to be 
scientiﬁc in order to be effective’.199 That is, reﬂexivity that shies away from 
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making claims to scientiﬁc validity fails to overcome the limited status of 
rhetorically motivated speculation based on common sense and on personal 
experiences of everyday reality. A socially committed sociology200 is a critical 
undertaking that faces up to the fact that ‘scientiﬁc work [has] political 
implications’,201 even – or, perhaps, especially – if and when these are unin- 
tended and not immediately obvious. Sociology cannot escape the horizons of 
normativity emerging from the construction of value-laden, meaning-laden, 
perspective-laden, interest-laden, power-laden and tension-laden realities. 
Aware of both the negative and the positive contributions that science can 
make to the development of society, sociology has a major task on its hands 
when drawing on the power of reﬂexivity in order to contribute to the con- 
struction of realities in which – at least in principle – all humans can ﬂour- 
ish and which, therefore, deserve to be characterized as ‘really or potentially 
emancipatory’.202 
 
Conclusion 
As shown in the preceding analysis, Bourdieu’s conception of reﬂexivity is com- 
plex and multifaceted. By means of an in-depth examination of his key works, 
this chapter has aimed to demonstrate that twelve elements are particularly 
important to Bourdieu’s conception of reﬂexivity: (1) ‘science’, (2) ‘vigilance’, 
(3) ‘consciousness’, (4) ‘self-awareness’, (5) ‘critique’, (6) ‘self-objectiﬁcation’, 
(7) ‘distance-taking’, (8) ‘rupture’, (9) ‘epistemology’, (10) ‘historicization’, (11) 
‘understanding’ and (12) ‘emancipation’. From a Bourdieusian point of view, 
the concept of ‘reﬂexivity’ plays a pivotal role in the pursuit of sociology. Yet, 
the previous inquiry raises a number of signiﬁcant questions about controver- 
sial issues that need to be addressed when evaluating the merits of Bourdieu’s 
account of reﬂexivity. It is the task of this concluding section to consider some 
of these issues, which – following the structure of the foregoing study – can 
be synthesized on the basis of ‘twelve theses on Bourdieu’s conception of 
reﬂexivity’: 
 
1. Reﬂexivity needs science, and science needs reﬂexivity. The danger of falling into the trap of 
scientism arises, however, to the extent that science is hypostatized and, hence, 
treated as a catch-all endeavour, capable of producing pristine, infallible and 
omnipotent forms of knowledge. 
2. Reﬂexivity needs vigilance, and vigilance needs reﬂexivity. The risk of succumbing to academic  
narcissism  emerges,  however,  to  the  extent  that  vigilance is fetishized and 
– unwittingly – converted into a source of intellectual paralysis, which may 
lead researchers to be concerned more with themselves and their objectifying 
gaze than with their object of investigation. 
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3. Reﬂexivity needs consciousness, and consciousness needs reﬂexivity. We face the possibility of 
getting caught up in cognitivism, however, to the extent that we overestimate 
the civilizational signiﬁcance  of  actors’  consciousness and underestimate 
the sociological role of their unconscious. Even the most mindful ways of 
performing social actions, including those aimed at conducting social-
scientiﬁc research, cannot do away with the formative inﬂuence of 
constantly shifting – and largely implicit – background horizons. 
4. Reﬂexivity needs self-awareness, and self-awareness needs reﬂexivity. We are confronted 
with the issue of  subjectivism, however,  to the extent that we commit the error 
of attaching more importance to researchers’ attentiveness to their inner 
world than to their sustained engagement with the external world of  those 
whose lives they set out to  examine. 
5. Reﬂexivity needs critique, and critique needs reﬂexivity. We run the risk of conﬁning 
ourselves to a stiﬂing position of normativism, however, to the extent that we 
attribute more weight to the critique of the criticizing gaze than to the 
critique of the social arrangements put in place to sustain mechanisms of 
social domination and thereby to undermine processes of human 
emancipation. Sociologists have described, analysed, interpreted, explained 
and assessed the world in different ways; the point is to change it. 
6. Reﬂexivity needs self-objectiﬁcation, and self-objectiﬁcation needs reﬂexivity. It is difficult to 
bypass the problem of objectivism, however, to the extent that reality is 
conceived of as a conglomerate of merely factual properties,  rather than in 
terms of a combination of objectively established, normatively constructed and 
subjectively projected assemblies of actuality, which constitute relationally 
constituted frameworks for human agency. 
7. Reﬂexivity needs distance-taking, and distance-taking needs reﬂexivity. The epistemological 
stance of externalism becomes a methodological challenge, however, to the 
extent that one treats the perspective of the sociological observer as superior 
to that of the social actor. Immersion can be as much an obstacle to 
understanding as it can be a key to insight. 
8. Reﬂexivity needs rupture, and rupture needs reﬂexivity. Instead of submitting to the 
seductive force of epistemological reductionism, however, to the extent that 
one considers one mode of knowledge production categorically more 
valuable than another, it is sensible to recognize the cognitive complexity 
permeating all symbolically mediated representations of reality. 
(a) Scientiﬁc knowledge can be superior to ordinary knowledge to the degree 
that it permits us to uncover underlying causalities that escape our 
common-sense grasp of reality. 
(b) Ordinary knowledge can be superior to scientiﬁc knowledge to the degree  
that  it  captures  the  socio-ontological  immediacy  of people’s 
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everyday epistemologies: the authenticity of subjectively experienced 
and intersubjectively shaped processes of perception, appreciation 
and action escapes the reifying lenses of conceptual sophistication and 
methodological  objectiﬁcation. 
(c) Both ordinary knowledge and scientiﬁc knowledge can be insightful 
to the degree that they can express epistemically forceful modes of 
attributing meaning to objectively, normatively or subjectively 
constituted actualities. One of the greatest epistemological challenges 
for sociology consists in cross-fertilizing – rather than strictly 
separating – ordinary and scientiﬁc ways of relating to, engaging with 
and acting upon reality. 
9. Reﬂexivity needs epistemology, and epistemology needs reﬂexivity. The problem 
of rationalism poses itself, however, to the extent that social-scientiﬁc 
researchers privilege rational over non-rational ways of relating to the world. 
Seemingly non-rational – notably, artistic –  modes  of  grappling with reality 
deserve a place in sociology insofar as they contribute to a critical 
understanding of the world capable of drawing on the purposive, 
cooperative and creative resources of humanity. 
10. Reﬂexivity needs historicization, and historicization needs reﬂexivity. The overt or 
tacit advocacy of relativism becomes apparent, however,  to the extent  that 
sociologists – if they choose to do so – follow the constructivist dogma that 
every worldly phenomenon can be studied in terms of social malleability, 
cultural contingency and historical indeterminacy.  The  fact that everything 
is context-laden does not mean that ‘anything goes’. 
11. Reﬂexivity needs understanding, and understanding needs reﬂexivity. The endorsement 
of interpretivism is problematic, however, to the extent that ‘understanding’ and 
‘explanation’ are conceived of as two mutually exclusive, rather than 
complementary, paradigms. Just as we need to understand the power of 
explanation, we need to explain the power of understanding. Instead of 
attaching the sphere of objectivity exclusively to the paradigm of explanation and, 
correspondingly, the spheres of normativity and subjectivity solely to the 
paradigm of understanding, we should explore the degree to which the 
constitutive elements of human reality can be explicated and interpreted in terms 
of a combination of physical, cultural and personal properties. 
12. Reﬂexivity needs emancipation, and emancipation needs reﬂexivity. An idealist position that 
is inspired by the promises of positivist utopianism is misleading, however, to 
the extent that it portrays sociology as a scientiﬁc tool capable of providing 
a theoretically coherent and practically viable blueprint for the construction 
of an emancipatory society. It is crucial to reject all forms of socio-ontological 
romanticism, according to which human lifeworlds constitute power-free 
realms of  pristine intersubjectivity. It is no 
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less important, however, to discard all forms of socio-ontological fatalism, 
according to which all human actions are driven by competitive struggles 
over power and legitimacy. In contrast to these reductive perspectives, the 
position of socio-ontological realism does justice to the fact that human life 
forms are characterized by the tension-laden coexistence of power-laden and 
power-critical, competitive and cooperative, egoistic and altruistic 
dimensions, which have always shaped – and which will always continue to 
shape – the course of history, irrespective of its protagonists’ degree of 
reﬂexivity. 
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